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Abstract
Agency in financial markets has been claimed to foster excessive risk taking, ultimately
leading to bubble formation. The main driving factor appears to be the skewed bonus
system for agents who invest other people’s money. The resulting excessive risk taking
on behalf of others would imply that such bonus systems crowds out responsible decision
making for others in order to serve egoistic self-interest. To test this implication, we
conduct laboratory experiments comparing decision making for others with and without
such a bonus system. First, we show that, in the absence of bonus systems, decision makers
invested significantly less for others than for themselves. Second, we show that limited
liable decision makers—participating only in gains but not in losses—invested substantially
more for others than for themselves. Hence, our results suggest that indeed limited liability
outweighs responsibility.
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1 Introduction
Economic research on risk attitudes has traditionally focused on individual decision making
without much consideration for potential social influences (see e.g., Dohmen et al., 2011; Eckel
and Grossman, 2008b; Harbaugh et al., 2010; Holt and Laury, 2002). As real world decisions are
embedded in a social context however, a decision maker is hardly ever the only person affected
by the consequences of his actions. In fact, many risky decisions are specifically taken on behalf
of a third party, e.g. the decision maker’s family or business partners. On a larger scale,
a CEO’s decision might affect the company or even industry, and political decisions affect a
country’s future. On financial markets, investors usually put an investment adviser or a money
manager in charge of their risky investments. It has been a long standing claim—especially
since the last financial crisis—that this practice of delegated portfolio investment, with its
skewed bonus systems, leads to excessive risk-taking and ultimately to bubble formation (e.g.,
Allen and Gorton, 1993). Taking excessive risks with the clients’ money is largely attributed
to the limited liability payment schemes prevalent in these markets (Allen and Gorton, 1993;
Allen and Gale, 2000; Cheung and Coleman, 2014; Kleinlercher et al., 2014). However, the
question remains whether such payment schemes alter the money managers’ behaviour towards
excessive risk taking or whether taking investment decisions on behalf of others—independent
of the payment scheme— already increases risk taking.
To answer this question, we study investment decisions for others in a laboratory experiment
in conditions with and without limited liability. First, we try to establish whether agency
without or with perfectly aligned monetary incentive schemes increases risk taking for others.
Second, we introduce limited liability with the propensity to “privatize profits and socialize
losses” to see whether this affects risk taking for others. We are the first to consider such a
decision environment in the laboratory.
The terms “risky shift” and “cautious shift” introduced by Stoner (1961) describe situations
in which the initial individual level of risk preference is altered due to exogenous impacts.
Without any prior assumptions, taking responsibility for others could result in a shift in either
direction.
In the psychological literature, a prominent explanation for a risky shift is “psychological
self-other distance”(e.g., Beisswanger et al., 2003; Cvetkovich, 1972; Stone and Allgaier, 2008;
Trope and Liberman, 2010; Wray and Stone, 2005), in which the assessment of a potential loss
in a risky situation is decreasing in the distance of the affected party to the decision maker.
This finding translates directly to the results from economic experiments which report a risky
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shift in hypothetical risk taking without monetary consequences (e.g., Harrison, 2006; Holt and
Laury, 2002, 2005). Albrecht et al. (2011) find that making inter-temporal decisions for others
results in lesser activation of areas of the brain that are thought to be engaged in emotion and
reward-related processes, than when taking decisions for oneself. The resulting argument would
be that decisions made on behalf of a third party are equivalent to situations without any real
outcome.
In contrast, Charness and Jackson (2009) propose “responsibility alleviation” as an expla-
nation for a cautious shift. Taking responsibility for a third party’s welfare induces pro-social
behavior which results in conservative risk taking (Charness, 2000; Charness and Jackson, 2009).
Several studies report a cautious shift. Physicians, for example, have been found to prefer treat-
ments with higher mortality rates for themselves than what they recommend to their patients
(Garcia-Retamero and Galesic, 2012; Ubel et al., 2011). Managers also try to avoid responsibil-
ity for decisions with even a minimal probability of hazardous outcomes (Swalm, 1966; Viscusi
et al., 1987). Using controlled laboratory experiments, we aim to ultimately determine whether
agency in risky financial decisions leads to increased risk taking and what role limited liability
plays in this observation.
In our experiment, a decision maker (henceforth “money manager”) took investment decisions
for himself and for six other subjects (henceforth “clients”) using the investment environment
from Gneezy and Potters (1997). First, we tested whether the money manager invests more
or less—took more or less risk—for himself than for his clients. In the individual decision
making treatment ‘IND’, the money manager invested for himself only. Further, we needed a
treatment in which the money manager invests for his clients only—without any own payoff
consequences—denoted as ‘OTH’. Finally, we considered a treatment with perfectly aligned
payoffs—denoted as treatment ‘ALL’—in which the money manager invests the same amount
for himself AND for his clients; here, IND and OTH were combined in one decision. With
this treatment, we can see whether the money manager invests in line with his egoistic pref-
erences—invests the same amount in IND and in ALL—or whether he steps back to invest in
line with his social preferences—invests the same in OTH and ALL. Therefore, we adminis-
tered a within-subjects design to enable the analysis of individual heterogeneity controlling for
order effects. Our study is the first to systematically compare these theoretically very different
situations. Second, we implemented limited liability by replacing OTH with a new treatment
‘LIM’. Here, the money manager earns a fixed percentage from each client’s profit, while an
investment failure has no monetary consequence for the money manager. In general, such an
option-like payment scheme increases risk taking already in individual decision making. The
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question is, however, whether the money manager takes excessive risks with the clients’ money
to increase his own payoff, suggesting rather anti-social behaviour. Here, we compare LIM to
OTH in a between-subject design.
Our aggregate results indicate investment behavior to be in line with responsibility alle-
viation, as we observed a clear cautious shift. The money managers invested significantly
less when clients bore the consequences (OTH), even when the money manager’s payoff was
perfectly aligned (ALL). Limited liability, however, changes the picture drastically; money man-
agers show a significant risky shift and invest significantly more in LIM than in OTH. Limited
liability clearly crowded out the effects of responsibility.
2 Related Literature
In recent years a growing body of literature has studied risky decisions for others using economic
experiments—finding mixed results. Some studies find evidence for a risky shift using first price
sealed bid auctions and multiple price lists (Chakravarty et al., 2011) or investment decisions
(Polman, 2012; Pollmann et al., 2014; Sutter, 2009). In contrast, plenty of studies find evidence
for a cautious shift using lottery choices (Reynolds et al., 2009; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2010),
investment decisions (Eriksen and Kvaløy, 2010), or strategic risk taking in stag-hunt games
(Charness and Jackson, 2009). Pahlke et al. (2015) find both, a risky shift in the loss domain and
a cautious shift in the gain domain using a battery of lotteries. Finally, using a multiple price list
Andersson et al. (2016) find little evidence for a significant shift in either direction. All studies
listed above consider ‘risk taking for others’. They focus on the difference between making a
decision for oneself and making the same decision for an anonymous stranger. However, there
are important differences in the decision maker’s payoff when making decisions for others. Either
the decision maker decides for the others only and earns a lump sum payment independent of
the client’s earnings (OTH), or the decision maker makes the same decision for himself and
the others with equal payoff consequences (ALL). The previous studies on decision making
for others have each exclusively considered either OTH or ALL.1 While standard models of
rational behavior predict similar investments in IND and ALL, based on the decision maker’s
utility function without other-regarding preferences, there is no standard-theoretical prediction
in OTH (Eriksen and Kvaløy, 2010). We conduct a systematic study of the impact of these two
types of decision making for others, by implementing both treatments using a within-subjects
design.
1The only exception is the study by Andersson et al. (2016). However, they do not discuss theoretical
differences nor do they compare OTH and ALL in their analysis.
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Convex incentive structures in financial institutions seem to foster excessive risk taking in
financial markets, which is supposed to be one of the causes for market bubbles (e.g., Bebchuk
and Spamann, 2009; Dewatripont et al., 2010; French et al., 2010; Gennaioli et al., 2012). Ra-
jan (2006) even argues that one of the main origins of instability in highly developed financial
markets are widely used convex incentives structures. In many cases, the managers’ incentives
are barely aligned with the investors’ interests. The agency problem of misaligned incentives
of money managers and their clients and its effects on markets is theoretically considered by
Allen and Gorton (1993); money managers do not share the losses but earn a proportion of the
profits. Such a convex incentive structure induces the money managers to trade at prices above
fundamental value, causing a price bubble. Holmen et al. (2014) tested this conjecture exper-
imentally and found convex incentives to inflate prices. However, the experimental literature
only s convex incentive structures and the effects on markets. What appears to be missing are
the effects on investment decisions when clients are immediately affected, i.e. when a money
manager is investing the clients’ money facing convex incentive structures. We aim to fill this
gap.
3 Design and Procedures
In this experiment, subjects made investment decisions in line with Gneezy and Potters (1997)
which is an established tool to elicit investment decisions under different conditions. The amount
invested provides a good metric for capturing treatment effects and differences in attitudes to-
ward risk taking between individuals; see Charness et al. (2013) for a detailed discussion. We
consider four different decision environments: individual decision making (’IND’), decision mak-
ing for others (’OTH’), decision making for others and for oneself (’ALL’), and decision making
under limited liability (’LIM’) using a mixture of within- and between-subject comparisons.
3.1 Experimental Design
In our individual decision making treatment (’IND ’, I ), each subject was endowed with nine
euro and was asked to decide on the amount to invest in a risky asset.2 With a probability of
2/3 the amount invested was lost and with a probability of 1/3 the investment was returned in
addition to a gain of 2.5 times the amount invested. For X ∈ {0, 9} being the amount invested,
the subject earned either πI = 9−X, in case of a loss, or πI = 9 + 2.5X, in case of a win.
In our others treatment (’OTH ’, O), subjects were randomly organized in groups of seven,
2Instructions can be found in the appendix section B.4
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consisting of six passive members, the clients (c), and one active member, the money manager
(m). Each client was endowed with nine euro and the money manager decided on the amount
to invest in the risky asset for each of the six clients. The amount invested was identical for all
clients. Hence, each client earned either πOc = 9 −X, in case of a loss, or πOc = 9 + 2.5X, in
case of a win. The money manager was unaffected by the outcome of the investment, πOm = 0.
Additionally, we ran some extra sessions (’OTH315’) with πOm = 31.5 to test whether a high
fixed payment—the highest possible payment for the client—affected the money manager’s
investment decision. In contrast to the literature, we significantly increase responsibility for
others as each money managers invested on behalf of six clients instead of only one.
In our aligned treatment (’ALL’, A), we implemented the same group protocol as in OTH,
but also endowed the money manager with nine euro. Now, the money manager decided on the
amount to invest which was binding for each of the six clients and for himself. Each subject,
the clients and the money manager, earned either πAc = πAm = 9 + 2.5X in case of a win or
πAc = π
A
m = 9−X in case of a loss.
In our limited liability treatment (’LIM ’, L), we also implemented the same group protocol
as in OTH. In contrast, the money manager earned a fee which equaled five percent from each
clients’ profit in case of a win. In case of a loss, however, the money manager faced no monetary
consequences. Hence, in case of a win the payoff was XLm = 0.05 × 6 × 2.5X for the money
manager and XLc = 9 + (1 − 0.05) × 2.5X for each client. In case of a loss, the payoff was
XLm = 0 for the money manager and XLc = 9 −X for each client. Hence, the money manager
participated only in gains but not in losses. However, th fee is quite small; note that risking
the entire endowment for all clients (in total 54 euro) earns an expected payoff of just about
2.25 euro for the money manager. To control whether the magnitude of the fee influenced the
decision, we ran some extra sessions (treatment ‘LIM50’ ) in which the fee equaled 50 percent
instead of five percent. Now, the payoff in case of a win was changed to XLm = 0.5×6×2.5X for
the money manager and XLc = 9+(1− 0.5)× 2.5X for each client. Hence, the clients’ expected
earnings for X euro invested was negative: (1 − 0.5) × 2.5X × 1/3 −X × 2/3 = −1/4X. Any
amount invested yields an expected loss for the clients but high expected gains for the money
manager.
3.2 Implementation
The experiment was programmed and conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Upon arrival
subjects were randomly placed at computer terminals separated by blinds. For each treatment,
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instructions were read aloud separately and questions were answered privately. The experiment
only started once the instructor was sure that all subjects had comprehended the instructions.
Once the experiment started, each money manager was endowed with an on-screen calculator
which calculates potential payoffs for the money manager himself and/or the clients for arbi-
trarily entered investment levels (screenshots can be found in appendix B.5). Eventually, the
money manager selected one investment from the generated list and confirmed his choice.
In each session, the subjects made investment decisions in three separate treatments. To
exclude hedging effects from repetitions or cross-game effects, only one of the three treatments
was payoff relevant (Charness et al., 2016). The subjects were informed that the experiment
would consist of three independent parts, without specifying the exact nature of each part
upfront. The instructions for each part were distributed only after the previous part was
concluded.
In OTH, ALL, and LIM, each subject made the investment decision in the role of the money
manager. At the end of the session, one of the seven subjects was randomly determined to be
the active money manager while the remaining six subjects became the passive clients. To avoid
accountability effects, we guaranteed anonymity (Pollmann et al., 2014). Neither the money
managers knew the identity of the clients nor did the clients know the identity of the money
manager.
To avoid psychological anchoring effects, such as gamblers fallacy or hot hand fallacy, sub-
jects did not receive any information on the outcome of their investments. To determine the
payoffs, one subject first threw a dice to determine the payoff relevant treatment and then
threw a dice for each group to determine the outcome of the investment. The computer finally
assigned the roles as money manager and clients in a group. Subjects were payed privately in
cash.
We additionally elicited sex, age, field of study, self-reported risk preferences (Dohmen
et al., 2011), and a social responsibility indicator (Berkowitz and Lutterman, 1968). The latter
two provide information on the general willingness to take risks (likert scale, 1-10) and social
responsibility, the tendency to help others without expecting any immediate personal reward
(score from eight likert scales 1-7).
All sessions were conducted at the [double-blind, location hidden]. Our participants were
mainly bachelor students from all departments of [double-blind, location hidden]. Subjects
participated only once in this experiment. Figure 1 provides an overview of the implementation
and the comparisons together with the investment means for all treatments.
To answer our first research question, whether money managers take more or less risk for
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Figure 1: Overview of experiments with strategy for comparison
Notes. The figure shows the treatments as conduced in the sessions with ALL as the last treatment; however, we also
tested for order effects. Additionally, we provide the investment means. The links with diamonds indicate within-
subject considerations and links with bullets between-subject considerations.
others than for themselves, we ran 15 sessions with a total of 140 participants. We implemented
two different setups. In setup one (70 observations), the treatment order was OTH-IND-ALL.
In setup two (70 observations), the treatment order was ALL-IND-OTH. Average payments
were 15.82 euro (max. 34.5, min. 3, SD 10.10) including a show-up fee of 3 euro. As indicated
in figure 1, we make use of a within-subject consideration (links with diamonds). Additionally,
we ran three high payoff sessions in the order OTH315-IND-ALL (35 observations). Average
payments were 10.95 euro (max. 34.5, min. 3, SD 8.64) including a show-up fee of 3 euro. Here,
we aimed to compare OTH315 to OTH. All sessions lasted roughly half an hour.
To answer the question whether limited liability has an impact on decision making for
others, we ran five sessions with a total of 105 participants. We implemented two different
setups. In setup one (49 observations), the treatment order was LIM-IND-ALL. In setup two
(56 observations), the treatment order was ALL-IND-LIM. Average payments were 16.43 euro
(max. 34.5, min. 3, SD 10.74) including a show-up fee of 3 euro. To see whether the size of
the fee plays an important role, we ran three additional sessions with high fees, 50 percent, in
the order LIM50-IND-ALL (21) and ALL-IND-LIM50 (28). Average payments were 16.27 euro
(max. 70.5, min. 8, SD 12.75) including a show-up fee of 3 euro. The experiments lasted about




Our experimental setup focuses on two considerations. The first consideration is about the
differences in decision making for others and for oneself using the sessions with the treatments
IND, ALL, and OTH (140 observations). Our second focus lies on the implementation of limited
liability, comparing mainly the 140 observations in OTH to the 105 observations in LIM.
For the first consideration, we are less interested in individual investment levels; our focus lies
on the shift of investments comparing IND and OTH, and IND and ALL respectively. As stated
above, the decision in IND will be determined by the subjects’ risk preferences (Charness et al.,
2013). For the decisions in ALL, economic standard models of perfectly rational and egoistic
agents make clear predictions. Without other-regarding preferences the money manager is just
investing the same amount as in IND, i.e. XI = XA. However, the standard models provide no
predictions for OTH as the payment for the money manager is not aligned to the investment
decision. Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010) as well as Andersson et al. (2016) pick up the social
distance hypothesis arguing that loss aversion is less pronounced when deciding for others than
when deciding for oneself, as these decisions are perceived as less important. Indeed Füllbrunn
and Luhan (2017) report experimental evidence for lower levels of loss aversion when decisions
are taken for others compared to decisions for oneself. However, our setup by design does not
emphasize losses as the payoff on screen is framed only in the gain domain (the total payoff is
displayed). Coming back to responsibility alleviation (Charness, 2000; Charness and Jackson,
2009), we should find that money managers’ behavior will be more conservative when investing
for others, i.e., XI > XO.3 When the money manager believes his clients to have similar
risk preferences as he has, he would—in line with the false consensus effect (Ross et al., 1977)
—invest the same amount for himself as for the clients, i.e., XI = XO.
Another prominent model to explain differences between risky decisions for oneself and for
other, the self-others discrepancy effect, describes a bias when predicting others’ risk aversion,
as this is perceived to be different from the individual’s own risk preference. In the context of
our design this would state that money managers evaluate their own risk preferences differently
than the risk preferences of their clients (Hsee and Weber, 1997; Eckel and Grossman, 2008a)
leading to an observed shift. The direction and magnitude of the predicted shift depends on the
3As the investment in our experiment has a positive expected payoff, it is not immediately clear that low
investments are a "responsible" choice. As one reviewer pointed out, it could be seen as responsible to maximize
the clients expected payoffs with a maximal investment. Our definition of a shift driven by responsibility,
however, follows Charness and Jackson (2009) who clearly predict a decrease in the risks taken on behalf of
others.
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risk attitudes of the money managers relative to their clients. If money managers believe their
clients to be relatively risk averse, they would invest less for their clients than for themselves
(XI > XO), while money managers who believe their clients to be relatively risk seeking, would
invest more for their clients than for themselves (XI < XO).
The investment decision in ALL might induce a conflict of preferences when the egoistic
preferences of the money manager and the social preferences for clients clash. On one side of
the spectrum, social preferences play no role (XA = XI) inline with the economic prediction
of an egoistic decision maker who strictly follows his own preferences. On the other end of the
spectrum, social preferences for the clients would completely crowd out egoistic preferences,
i.e., XA = XO. When we assume that both preferences play a role in the consideration of the
money manager, the investment in ALL is expected to be in-between investments in IND and
OTH, i.e., either XI > XA ≥ XO (for a cautious shift) or XI < XA ≤ XO (for a risky shift).
Note that the interaction of social and/or egoistic preferences in risky decision making can only
be studied when all three treatments are considered in a within-subjects design.
In LIM, standard economic theory would predict the money manager to invest the full
amount. Such behaviour would also be optimal for risk averse clients. Expected returns from
investment are positive and higher investments lead to higher expected payoffs, at least when
the fee is merely five percent. Hence, neglecting responsibility as in standard economic theory,
we predict subjects to invest the entire amount in the LIM treatments. However, there might
be a conflict between the monetary incentives that trigger the egoistic preferences and other-
regarding preferences—the former predicting high investment while the latter a rather cautious
investment. Nonetheless, high investment in LIM can still be judged as acting in line with risk
neutral clients. This argument does not hold any longer for a fee of 50 percent though. Here,
the clients clearly suffer from excessive risk taking due to their negative expected payoff (e.g.,
Allen and Gorton, 1993). In contrast to OTH, the decision maker now has an incentive to take
risks in order to earn a positive payoff for himself. If responsibility plays the main role, however,
we expect similar investment levels in OTH and LIM. When egoistic preferences play the main
role, the money managers will not hesitate to risk the entire endowment of the clients.
4 Results
We first consider the effect of risk taking for others by testing within-subjects whether differences
exist between XI , XA, and XO. Then, we consider the effect of limited liability by testing
between-subjects whether differences exist between XO and XL. We also consider a fixed
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payment effect in OTH (vs. OTH315) and an effect of a 50% fee in LIM (vs LIM50) between-
subjects. The p-values for the all tests conducted were derived from two sided permutation
tests.
4.1 Risk Taking for Others
To test whether money managers take more or less risk for others, we use each subject’s shift
in investments as the relevant unit of observation, i.e., SA = XA − XI and SO = XO − XI .
While negative values indicate a cautious shift, positive values indicate a risky shift. Table 1
provides averages (and standard deviations) for investment levels and shifts for 140 independent
observations.4.







XI 4.53 (2.42) 3.19 (1.75) 5.42 (2.49)
XA 3.92 (1.91) 3.04 (1.50) 4.41 (1.96)
XO 3.87 (2.21) 3.24 (1.96) 4.27 (2.40)
SA -0.60∗∗∗ (1.57) -0.15 (0.85) -1.01∗∗∗ (1.86)
SO -0.65∗∗∗ (2.39) 0.05 (1.65) -1.15∗∗∗ (2.75)
Notes. The second column contains averages for all observations. The next two columns categorize subjects in two
groups according to elicitation of risk attitudes in line with Dohmen et al. (2011). Subjects in the group below median
(above median) stated below (above) median risk attitudes on a scale from 1 - 10. Rows report average investments
and average shifts together with the standard deviation in parentheses. The asterisks refer to the p-value from a
permutation test testing the Null that S equals zero (** = p <0.05, *** = p <0.01).
The table shows that investment levels in ALL and in OTH are on average about 13 and
14 percent lower than in IND, respectively. Using a two-sided permutation test, we confirm a
significant cautious shift for ALL and for OTH which is on average at SA = −0.60 (p < 0.001)
and at SO = −0.65 (p < 0.001), respectively.5 Thus, we state observation 1.
Observation 1. Money managers invest significantly less for their clients than for themselves
in ALL and in OTH.
This result is a clear indication of acting in line with the responsibility alleviation hypothesis.
We find a significant cautious shift, not only in OTH but also in ALL, which is in contrast to
the prediction of the standard rationality models.
4As we find no significant order effect in non-parametric tests and regressions, we pool all 140 observations
(see appendix B.1 and A)
5We find no significant relationship between demographics and decision making for others nor was the social
responsibility score significant (see appendix table A.5 and A.6).
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The self-other discrepancy might be seen as a refinement of trying to act responsibly, as
the money manager tries to act according to the investors risk preferences while deviating from
his personal preferences. According to this view, the direction of the observed shift depends
on the perceived risk preferences of the clients in comparison to the money managers own
risk preferences. Therefore, we conjecture that relatively risk averse subjects invest more for
others while relatively risk seeking subjects invest less for others. To test this conjecture, we
consider the self-reported willingness to take general risks based on Dohmen et al. (2011) which
provides a number from 1 (not willing to take risks) to 10 (willing to take high risk). We
make use of a median split to compare two groups; the relatively risk averse subjects (reported
general risk below 5) and the relatively risk seeking subjects (reported general risk above 5;
we neglect 23 observations at the median). Table 1 indicates that in the below-median group
the shift not significantly different from zero. In the above-median group, however, the general
pattern observed above is quite strong, i.e., we find a significant cautious shift in ALL and in
OTH (for both p < 0.001).6 As the averages in table 1 already suggest, we find a significant
effect comparing above-median group and below-median group for each of the five variables
(p < 0.025). Thus, we state observation 2.
Observation 2. Investment levels in OTH and ALL do barely differ for rather risk averse
money managers, while rather risk seeking money managers show a significant cautious shift.
Observation 2 appears to be in line with the self-other-distance theory. Money managers in
the above median risk group tend to assume that they are relatively risk seeking in comparison
to the population while at least the averages suggest the opposite for the risk averse money
managers. The decisions for their clients reflect a propensity towards the perceived average
preference of their clients; finally, the above median risk level money managers are clearly
driving the aggregate results. The regression in the appendix (Table A.5) shows a clear picture:
the higher the willingness to take general risks, the higher the cautious shift.
These conclusions are only derived from observed behavior under the assumption that money
managers did indeed presume the average risk aversion to be higher or lower than their personal
risk preferences. To test whether this assumption was correct or a mere artifact, we let the
subjects estimate the investment level XI of the other subjects’ (unincentivized) which we
denote XIb.7 Table 2 reports respective measures.
6Implementing the same analysis by categorizing subjects according to their observed risk preference in the
IND treatment (XI), we get similar results (see appendix B.3).
7To elicit beliefs, we included the question “What would you say, how much do others in your group on
average invest for themselves? ” in the questionnaire. We abstained from using incentivized believe elicitation
methods as this would increase the complexity and duration of the experiment with vague additional benefits
(see Trautmann and Kuilen, 2015, for a discussion). Unfortunately, we have elicited the beliefs for 91 subjects
12







XIb 4.41 (1.62) 3.85 (1.14) 4.65 (1.95)
XIb −XI 0.00 (2.22) 0.77∗∗∗ (1.32) -0.90∗∗∗ (2.36)
XIb −XO 0.58∗∗∗ (2.56) 0.92∗∗∗ (1.88) 0.05 (3.11)
Notes. The second column contains observations from 91 subjects from which we elicited beliefs. XIb, XI , and XO
denote the beliefs about the investments of others in IND, own investment in IND, and investment in OTH, respectively.
The next two columns categorize subjects in two groups according to elicitation of risk attitudes in line with Dohmen
et al. (2011). Subjects in the group below median (above median) stated below (above) median risk attitudes on a
scale from 1 - 10. The asterisks refer to the p-value from a permutation test testing the Null that S equals zero (** =
p <0.05, *** = p <0.01).
Taking all observations into account, the average difference between beliefs and own invest-
ment is not significantly different from zero (p = 0.979). This indicates that money managers
on average do not believe others to take less or more risk then they take for themselves. Such
thinking might lead money managers to take similar risks for others as they would take for
themselves in line with behaviour of financial advisers in Canada (Foerster et al., 2017).
On the individual level, however, the investment level in OTH can still deviate significantly
from the expectation of the average risk preference. Thus, we again separate between subjects
with general risk below and above the median, and find that the above median money managers
believe others to invest significantly less than they do (XIb−XI = −0.90, p < 0.001), while the
below median money managers believe others to invest significantly more (XIb − XI = 0.77,
p < 0.001). However, above-median risk takers generally believe others to take more risk than
below-median risk takers (p = 0.036).
The question remains, whether money managers in OTH invest in line with their beliefs,
i.e., does XIb −XO = 0 hold? Overall, we find money managers to invest significantly less for
their clients than what they believe their clients would invest for themselves (XIb−XO = 0.58,
p = 0.033). In particular, the below-median money managers invest significantly less for their
clients than what they believe their clients would invest for themselves (XIb − XO = 0.92,
p < 0.001). In contrast, the above median money managers tend to invest in line with their
beliefs about others (XIb − XO = 0.05, p = 0.701).8 Overall, the results suggest that money
managers are relatively conservative in that they invest at most what they believe the clients
would invest for themselves. This supports Bolton et al. (2015), who find that decision makers
act according to the preferences of their clients.
Finally, we compare investment levels between OTH and ALL, i.e., a situation in which the
only.
8However, comparing XIb −XO between the two categories we find no significant difference (p = 0.150).
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payment of the money manager is perfectly aligned (ALL) and when the payment is not aligned
(OTH). Results in table 1 indicate that differences between XA and XO are negligible when
considering all subjects (XA−XO = 0.05, p = 0.766), but also when considering subjects below
median risk attitudes (XA −XO = −0.14, p = 0.501) and above (XA −XO = 0.32, p = 0.246).
Hence, overall it seems that money managers in ALL put their egoistic preferences on hold to
match the preferences of the clients indicated by OTH.9
One caveat in our design might be the unequal payments of the active money manager
and the passive client in OTH. While the clients’ expected earnings are positive, the money
managers’ earnings are zero. When fairness preferences come into play, the money manager
might change his behavior to match his preferences for a fair allocation of payments (Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002, 2005; Fudenberg and
Levine, 2012). However, models that incorporate risk preferences and fairness preferences are
missing. Nonetheless, we wanted to control whether the money manager’s fixed payment in
OTH has an influence on decision making for others. Therefore, we compared the investment
levels in treatment OTH315 and OTH. We find no significant difference in investments compar-
ing the two treatments (see appendix section B.2 and the regression in appendix table A.5 and
A.6) suggesting that the money manager’s own unrelated payoff when deciding for his clients
in OTH plays a minor role. However, the power is not sufficient to claim that investment levels
in OTH315 and OTH come from the same population.10
4.2 Limited Liability
Section 4.1 shows that money managers in OTH invested less for others than for themselves.
In this section, we compare investment levels and shifts in OTH and in LIM between-subjects.
Figure 2 shows average investments (A) for IND (as the benchmark), OTH, and LIM and the
histograms (B) of OTH and LIM.11 Both figures show a clear difference between OTH and
LIM, i.e. subjects invest more in LIM than in OTH.
Table 4 reports the descriptives of the investments and shifts together with test statistics
for different categories of subjects. Considering the full data set, we find a clear and significant
difference between investing in OTH and in LIM. On average, the money managers invested
2.79 euro more in LIM than in OTH, a 77 percent increase. Even though order played a role
9However, even with n = 140 we would not be able to detect a small effect size of 0.2 as the power would
be only 0.63. Merging the data with observations from OTH315, i.e. having 175 observations, we still find no
significant difference but for the same parameters we get a decent power of 0.73.
10For a small effects size of 0.2, the power for a given number of observations of 70 and 35 respectively (same
order sessions) would be 0.28.
11We neglect ALL as the relevant comparison is between OTH and LIM.
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Figure 2: Comparing Investments: OTH vs LIM
(a) Average investments (b) Histogram of investments
Notes. Panel (a) displays average investment levels separated by treatments. The column labelled IND displays the
average investment for Experiments 1 and 2 combined. Error bars show the standard error. Panel (b) displays the
histogram of investments in OTH and LIM. The respective curves show the kernel densities—the solid line for OTH
and the dashed line for LIM.
in the sessions with LIM, i.e., money managers invested about one euro more when LIM was
played last than when LIM was played first (p = 0.014), investment levels and shifts remain
significantly higher in LIM than in OTH in both orders.
Additionally, we conducted a full analysis of session and treatment effects in a panel regres-
sion for which the results are reported in table 3. The dependent variable is the investment
level in euro. To compare the treatments in the sessions with OTH, ‘OTH-sessions’, to the ses-
sions with LIM, ‘LIM-sessions’ (row one vs. row two in the grey area in figure 1), we introduce
LIM session as a dummy for the latter sessions. Further, the dummy ALL equals 1 if ALL is
played (and zero otherwise) and the dummy OTH* equals 1 if the decision is made for others
(and zero otherwise), which is OTH in the OTH-sessions and LIM in the LIM-sessions. The
references was therefore the investment in IND in the OTH-sessions. Model 2 adds subjects
characteristics.
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Table 3: Session and treatment effects on investment





LIM sessions 0.020 0.026
(0.29) (0.25)
ALL × LIM session 0.56∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.17)






Wald test ALL × LIM session = OTH* × LIM session:
p-value < 0.001 < 0.001
χ2 64.67 64.32
Notes. Random-effects panel regression with robust standard errors, variables explained above. Column 1 contains
the estimation results without controlling for individual characteristics, column 2 contains the results from the same
estimation controlling for gender, age, self-reported risk preferences (Dohmen et al., 2011), and a social responsibility
indicator (Berkowitz and Lutterman, 1968). Standard errors in parentheses.(* = p <0.1, ** = p <0.05, *** = p
<0.01).
Firstly, the LIM session dummy is is not significant and close to zero. Hence, investments
in IND are not different comparing LIM- and OTH-sessions. Secondly, the OTH* coefficient
is significantly negative, which confirms the cautious shift in OTH, while the interaction co-
efficient OTH* × LIM-sessions is significantly positive which confirms the risky shift in LIM.
Third, the ALL coefficient is significantly negative, which confirms the cautious shift in ALL.
However, this effect is diminished in the LIM-sessions, suggested by the significantly positive
interaction coefficient ALL × LIM-sessions. Maybe money managers more generally invest
more for others in the LIM-sessions than in the OTH-sessions and the risky shift in LIM is just
a consequence. However, the interaction with ALL is significantly lower than the interaction
with OTH* confirmed by a Wald test (p < 0.001). This result confirms that even if money
managers invest generally more for others in the LIM-sessions than in the OTH sessions, the
effect is much stronger in OTH* than in ALL. These results remain unchanged if we control
for individual characteristics, as reported in the second column of table 3.
The significant increase of investments between OTH and LIM still holds if we compare
LIM to OTH separately for below- and above-median general risk group (see table 4), i.e.
independent of risk attitudes, investments in LIM exceed investments in OTH. To keep this
section concise, we provide respective regressions with shifts and investment levels as dependent
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Table 4: Investment in OTH and LIM
No Limited Liability Limited Liability
XO SO XL SL H0 : XO = XL
All 3.87 -0.65∗∗∗ 6.85 2.30∗∗∗ <0.001
(n=140/105) (2.22) (2.3) (2.15) (2.68)
Below Median risk 3.24 0.05 6.80 3.13∗∗∗ <0.001
(n=53/40) (1.96) (3.13) (2.25) (2.84)
Above Median risk 4.27 -1.15∗∗∗ 6.85 1.46∗∗∗ <0.001
(n=64/49) (2.4) (2.75) (2.11) (2.43)
OTH/LIM first 3.95 -0.77∗∗∗ 6.30 1.52∗∗∗ <0.001
(n=70/49) (1.85) (2.11) (2.13) (2.49)
OTH/LIM last 3.84 -0.53∗ 7.33 2.06∗∗∗ <0.001
(n=70/56) (2.54) (2.67) (2.98) (2.67)
Notes. The table reports averages (SD) of investment levels and shifts in the treatments OTH and LIM for all
observations, subjects in the category below and above median risk, and in the orders OTH-IND-ALL/LIM-IND-ALL
(‘first’) and in the orders ALL-IND-OTH/ALL-IND-LIM (‘last’). The number of observations are in brackets for
OTH/LIM. The last column shows the p-values from a permutation test testing the Null XO = XL in the different
categories. The asterisks refer to the p-value from a permutation test testing the Null that the shift equals zero (* =
p <0.1, ** = p <0.05, *** = p <0.01).
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variables and a LIM dummy plus controls as independent variables in the appendix (tables A.5
and A.6); these confirm our results as the LIM dummy is significantly positive. Hence, we state
observations 3 and 4.
Observation 3. Money managers invest significantly more for their clients than for themselves
in LIM.
Observation 4. Money Managers show a significant risky shift independent of personal risk
attitudes.
This appears to be an indication of egoistic-, monetary incentives crowding out the previ-
ously observed effects of responsibility. However, these higher investment levels for others in
LIM could in principle stem from the fact that the money managers believe their clients to prefer
higher investments. We have shown in section 4.1 that money managers in OTH acted rather
cautiously, investing less than, or at most what they believe their clients would invest them-
selves. While there is no obvious reason for a change in believes, such a shift would in principle
explain increased investments even if money managers still try to act responsibly. We therefore
again compare the investments with the elicited beliefs. The average difference between XL and
XIb equals 1.57 euro (SD 2.52) which is significantly positive (p < 0.001).12 Recall, in OTH
the average difference between XO and XIb was -0.58 (SD 2.36) which is significantly negative
(p = 0.035). Hence, without limited liability the money manager invests rather cautiously for
others, as he invests less than he believes others would invest for themselves. With limited lia-
bility, however, such cautious investment behavior has disappeared and investment levels were
higher than what the money managers believed their clients would prefer.
We implemented additional sessions to test whether a higher fee with negative expected
earnings changes the decisions for others for the money manager. The increase to a fee of 50
percent yields an average investment of 6.03 euro (SD 2.90) which is slightly lower than in
LIM with a five percent fee (6.85, p = 0.053).13 However, the shift is still significantly positive
(SLIM50=1.64 euro, SD 2.72, p < 001) and not significantly different to LIM (p = 0.158). Again,
investments are significantly higher than in OTH (p < 0.01). Hence, the money managers in
our setting seem to care less about the expected negative consequences for their clients.
As a side effect, the new LIM50 treatment also allows us to consider ex-ante and ex-post
fairness. If the money manager strives for equal expected earnings (ex-ante fairness), he should
have invested 3.27 euro to have an expected earning of 8.17 euro for each client and himself.
If instead the money manager strives for equal earnings (ex-post earnings), he should have
12Unfortunately, we have only 49 observations for the beliefs in this treatment.
13See also appendix table A.5.
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invested 1.44 euro to earn 10.80 euro for clients and himself in case of success; there was no way
for equal earnings in case of a loss. Nevertheless, as shown above, the investment in LIM50 is
significantly higher than 3.27 euro and of course than 1.44 euro (p < 0.001).
Looking at the clients’ expected earnings given the investments, we see that they were
highest in LIM (average 9.86 euro, SD 0.27), slightly but significantly lower in OTH (9.65 euro,
SD 0.37, p < 0.001), and significantly lower in LIM50 (7.49 euro, SD 0.73, p < 0.001). In
this particular setting, limited liability with a five percent fee increased the clients’ expected
earnings. On the one hand, the fee is sufficiently low to keep expected earnings positive, and
on the other hand, the convex incentives increased the investment levels. However, limited
liability with a 50 percent fee makes the investment opportunity unprofitable for the clients due
to negative expected returns.
5 Discussion
5.1 Risk Taking for Others
Our first question was, whether making decisions for others, in the absence of limited liability,
would lead to a risky or cautious shift as compared to decisions for oneself. In particular,
in contrast to the literature, our decision makers make decisions for a substantial number of
clients. This is a necessary first step in establishing whether it is limited liability that leads to
increased risk taking on financial markets. Overall, we find clear evidence of a cautious shift in
both OTH and ALL, which in our experiment is mainly driven by relatively risk seeking money
managers. They believe others to be more risk averse than themselves and act accordingly. Our
aggregate results are line with the results from Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010) who use a similar
design in a between-subject setting with only one client. However, our results differ from those
experiments in the literature who find rather a risky shift. How can we explain those mixed
results in the literature? In the following, we discuss some suggestions.
The conclusions from the literature are based on aggregate results only and the heterogeneity
of subjects with respect to risk attitudes has barely been considered. Due to our within-subject
design we are able to take the relative risk attitudes of the money manager into account. We
find that our results are driven by the relatively risk seeking subjects. Therefore, any study
with a rather risk averse subject pool would find an aggregate risky shift, of course. Differences
to Andersson et al. (2016), for instance, might be due to the fact that their subject pool is
taken from the general Danish population which has been found to be more risk averse than
19
the common student population (von Gaudecker et al., 2012).
Among others, Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010) report that hypothetical decision making for
others —the most extreme social distance—leads to higher risk taking in comparison to a
situation with monetary consequences. Thus, experiments with higher social distance, which is
the case for internet experiments as opposed to laboratory experiments, might lead to higher risk
taking for others. Furthermore, our experimental design allows the potential money managers
to put themselves into the shoes of their clients, as the money manager becomes a client with
a probability of 6/7. This might lead to a higher empathy for the others leading to a cautious
shift (as in the equal opportunity mode treatment in Bolton and Ockenfels, 2006).
Experiments in which the subjects pick lotteries rather than making investments, the results
seem to support a risky shift in the loss domain or in the mixed domain, while lotteries in the
gain domain support a cautious shift (Pahlke et al., 2015). One reason might be that loss
aversion is weaker when making decisions for others (see e.g. Füllbrunn and Luhan (2017)).
In our Gneezy and Potters (1997) investment game, however, we cannot control the subjects’
reference point, as we have no record of the editing phase (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
When the endowment is integrated, the decision takes place in the gain domain only (9+ 2.5X
vs. 9−X). When the endowment is segregated, the decision takes place in the mixed domain
(2.5X vs. −X). As we provide integrated outcomes on the decision screen, the subjects might
have perceived the task in the gain domain (see screenshot appendix B.5).
While money managers are assumed to know their own preferences, they are uncertain
about their clients’ preferences; in particular when estimating the preferences of six clients.
This creates an ambiguous situation when deciding for others in contrast to when deciding for
oneself. From this point of view, our results are in line with ambiguity aversion, as subjects take
less risk in a situation with higher ambiguity (e.g., Trautmann and Van De Kuilen, 2015). This
effect might be amplified due to comparative ignorance (Fox and Tversky, 1995) as in a within-
subject design subjects are able to compare decisions for others and for themselves. When
money managers observe the decision of their clients in OWN beforehand, we would reduce
ambiguity and thus can see whether they behave indeed in line with the client’s preferences as
our results on following their believes suggest, Bolton et al. (2015) also find that the decision
maker follows their client’s own choice (for one single client). However, how money managers
select the level of investment when they know the preferences of several clients in a group
remains a question for future research. So far, subjects in a group had to discuss and agree on
one common amount to invest; the results support a risky shift (Sutter, 2009).
Further design elements might be interesting to reconsider. For example, we only consider a
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situation under anonymity; the money manager’s identity is not revealed nor is s/he accountable
for his/her decision. When accountability comes into play, subjects might behave differently.
Pahlke et al. (2012) find that accountability leads to reduced risk aversion in mixed lotteries
with one ’client’. We consider a situation in which one subject is randomly chosen to be
the money manager, i.e. the decision is implemented with probability 1/7. When the money
manager knows for sure that his/her decision is implemented, s/he might be even more cautious.
Finally, we use a student subject pool for our experiments. It might be interesting to analyze the
same situation using the ’relevant decision maker’; Kirchler et al. (2019), for example, consider
financial professionals who make investment decisions for others (in a different setting though).
5.2 Limited liability
Our second research question asked whether limited liability triggers self-interest. Money man-
agers who participate in gains only do not risk their own money but the money of each of the
six clients. A risky shift in comparison to OTH would provide evidence that social preferences
of money managers are crowded out by egoistic monetary incentives. To be able to answer
this question, we invented a new experimental setting which has not been considered in the
literature before; in particular, only a substantial number of clients allows for a ’privatizing
gains and socializing losses’ environment.
We do indeed find a clear indication for a risky shift once we introduce limited liability.
This result is not driven by the beliefs about the clients preferences; as money managers invest
significantly more for their clients than what they believed their clients would prefer. The
investment levels taken for clients are significantly higher than for oneself. This result is quite
robust testing for the size of the bonus (5 percent or 50 percent), risk preferences (below- or
above-median risk), and order (LIM/OTH played first or last).14
The size of the bonus does not appear to play any role for this consideration. We compare
limited liability treatments with a five percent and a 50 percent bonus and find no difference in
investments. Given that the expected payoffs for their clients were negative with a 50 percent
bonus, the money managers’ decisions are clearly motivated by their own payoff expectations
with social preferences playing only an inferior role. In this treatment, investments could be
chosen such that expected earnings for the money manager and the clients were equal, both,
in line with ex-ante and ex-post fairness. However, we found that the investment levels under
limited liability were significantly higher than any fairness benchmark. We only consider two
14The result is also robust when separating the subjects by sex. For the interested reader, we have added
appendix D.11 considering gender effects.
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different bonus conditions. Future research might consider different bonus conditions to carve
out whether indeed the size of the bonus has an influence on the money manager, in particular
if higher bonuses have negative consequences for the clients.
One argument against our interpretation of the effects of limited liability on investment levels
might be that the observations are driven by a few participants who, for whatever reason, take
the maximum risk, i.e. invest the entire endowment. Without limited liability only six percent
invest the entire endowment; with limited liability 37 percent invest the entire endowment (41
percent in the 50 percent condition). The remaining money managers might behave in a similar
with and without limited liability. However, we still find a significant risky shift (p < 0.001).
6 Conclusion
Coming back to our real-world motivation, we asked the question whether limited liability
payment schemes on financial markets lead to money managers taking excessive risks when
investing their clients’ money (e.g., Allen and Gorton, 1993; Allen and Gale, 2000; Cheung and
Coleman, 2014; Kleinlercher et al., 2014). Such a situation involves two possible motivational
factors that could increase the willingness to take risks, the mere fact that the decision is taken
for somebody else, and limited liability. We decided to study both separately in an incremental
design. In the first condition, we aimed to establish whether money managers take higher risks
for their six clients in absence of limited liability. In a second condition, we introduced limited
liability to test whether behaviour changes in comparison to the first condition. We found that
agency in itself leads to a cautious shift, i.e. decision makers took less risk with other people’s
money. However, if gains are shared, while losses remain with the clients, we observe a risky
shift, i.e. decision makers took more risk with other people’s money. Our results clearly suggest
that decision makers on one hand have social preferences and invest more cautiously for others
than for themselves. On the other hand these social preferences are crowded out by egoistic
preferences as soon as we introduce limited liability.
Our findings of initially decreased risk taking are in line with responsibility alleviation, and
we found that investors seek to act according to the perceived preferences of their clients. Our
participants were aware of their relative risk preferences in that money managers with low
risk aversion sought lower risks for others than for themselves and money managers with high
risk aversion increased the risks taken for their clients. When the decision maker bears the
same consequences as their clients (ALL), the clients’ preferences seem to outweigh the money
manager’s own preferences. This situation changed drastically once we introduced limited
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liability in the form of convex incentives. Promising a five percent share of the possible returns
on investment, with losses being incurred only by the clients, was sufficient to increase the
investment levels by more than 77 percent. While the perception of what the clients would
prefer did not change, money managers nonetheless follow their own egoistic preferences and
invest much more. The emerging picture is that while decision makers initially try to accomplish
what their clients want and overall take lower risks for others, the convex incentives reverse the
decision. Apparently, social preferences are largely crowded out by egoistic monetary incentives.
The fact that in one treatment the expected profit was even negative for the clients did not
significantly change the money managers’ behaviour. A clear sign that egoistic preferences are
the main driver.
If one would want to draw conclusions for the financial markets, the recommendation is
straightforward. A fee based on the success of the investment, without consequence in case of
losses increases risk taking and potentially fosters bubble formation. Both a flat fee, as well as
a bonus including negative consequences in case of losses for the client leads to investments that
aim to follow the client’s preferences. However, the results stem from a laboratory experiment
and are not directly transferrable to the real world.
Our limited liability design is the first that applies convex incentives with consequences for
other people’s earnings in an experiment. This experimental design can be applied to answer
more questions regarding ‘privatizing profits and socializing losses’ scenarios. Such a design
could for example consider ’trust’ in the fund industry when money managers compete which
each other under convex incentives (Gennaioli et al., 2015; Agranov et al., 2014) but can also be
applied to asset market experiments to test whether such an environment indeed fosters asset
market bubbles (Holmen et al., 2014).
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In the tables A.5 and A.6, we regress the investment levels for the clients (XO and XL) and
the shifts (SO and SL) in OTH and LIM respectively on different treatments (dummy for LIM
(LIM ), dummy for high payment in OTH (High Payment), dummy for high fee in LIM (High
Fee)), on order (whether decision making for others (OTH or LIM) was first or last (Order = 1
if last), and on subjects’ background (general risk (Risk), female dummy (Female), age (Age),
dummy for the field of study being economics (Econ), and social responsibility (SRS )).
General risk equals the self-reported risk preference in form of a likert scale question from
one to ten with a higher number indicating a higher willingness to take risks(Dohmen et al.,
2011). The social responsibility score was taken from Berkowitz and Lutterman (1968)).
Table A.5 considers three OLS regressions considering the 140 observations without limited
liability (model 2) and the 105 observations with limited liability (model 3), and a model
including both (model 1) clustered at session level. The first model neglects the additional
treatments with higher payments in OTH (fixed payment was 31.50 euro instead of zero) or
higher fees in LIM (fee was 50 percent instead of 5 percent). The results reflect our observations.
Limited liability increases the shift significantly (observation 3. General risk decreases the shift
significantly 1 in model 2. However, general risk plays no significant role in model 3. The
additional treatments High Payment and High Fee show no or a weak correlation with the
shift, i.e. high payments for the money managers in OTH do not change risk taking for others
but a higher fee in LIM tends to reduces risk taking for other. The social responsibility score
has no influence on the shift.
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General Risk -0.36∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗ -0.11
(0.100) (0.11) (0.22)
Social Responsibility Score 0.16 0.025 -0.27
(0.26) (0.33) (0.39)
Female 0.099 -0.10 0.044
(0.29) (0.36) (0.32)
Econ -0.31 -0.35 0.15
(0.27) (0.34) (0.46)






Constant -0.073 -1.08 4.70∗∗
(1.61) (1.93) (1.83)
Observations 245 175 154
Adjusted R2 0.320 0.076 0.045
Notes. Variables explained above. Standard errors in parentheses. The asterisks refer to the p-value from a permutation
test testing the H0 that the shift equals zero (* = p <0.1, ** = p <0.05, *** = p <0.01).
Table A.6 considers similar regressions as table A.6. However, we now consider investment
levels instead of investment shifts and make use of truncated regressions censored at X = 0 and
X = 9. Money managers invest significantly more for their clients when limited liable. Further
on, order plays a role in the experiments with limited liability, i.e. subjects invest more when
LIM is played last. The money makers willingness to take risk is also reflected in the decision
for others, i.e. the higher the willingness to take risks, the higher the risk money managers take
for others. Finally, females seem to take less risk for their clients when limited liable.
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General Risk 0.16 0.28∗∗ 0.25
(0.12) (0.12) (0.29)
Social Responsibility Score 0.24 0.32 0.17
(0.36) (0.43) (0.26)
Female -0.72 -0.28 -1.74∗∗
(0.45) (0.45) (0.67)
Econ -0.90∗∗ -0.81∗ 0.095
(0.39) (0.43) (0.92)






Constant 2.47 0.49 9.01∗∗∗
(1.94) (1.80) (3.05)
Observations 245 175 154
Notes. Variables explained above. Standard errors in parentheses. The asterisks refer to the p-value from a permutation
test testing the H0 that the shift equals zero (* = p <0.1, ** = p <0.05, *** = p <0.01).
B Sessions with IND, ALL, and OTH
B.1 Order Effects
To test whether an order effect has an impact on investment levels, we compare 70 observations
in which subjects made investment decisions in the order OTH-IND-ALL and 70 observations
in the order ALL-IND-OTH.
We make use of a permutation tests to evaluate the Null that investment levels and shifts do
not differ comparing the two different orders. As table B.7 indicates, the order of the treatments
has no effect on the main variables of interest. Further on, observation 1 also holds each of the
two subsets.
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Table B.7: Order Differences
OTH-IND-ALL (70) ALL-IND-OTH (70) Difference (p-value)
XI 4.68 (2.59) 4.37 (2.25) 0.30 (0.461)
XA 3.85 (1.95) 4.00 (1.88) -0.15 (0.637)
XO 3.91 (1.85) 3.84 (2.54) 0.06 (0.864)
SA -0.83∗∗∗ (1.61) -0.38∗∗ (1.51) -0.45 (0.088)
SO -0.77∗∗∗ (2.11) -0.53∗ (2.67) -0.24 (0.558)
Notes. The table reports averages in investments and shifts in the three treatments separated by order. The last
column shows the p-values from a permutation test comparing the two previous columns. The asterisks refer to the
p-value from a permutation test testing the H0 that differences equal zero (* = p <0.1, ** = p <0.05, *** = p <0.01).
B.2 Fixed Payment Effects
To test whether the payment condition for the money manager in OTH has an impact on
investment levels we compare 70 observations with a zero payment for the decision maker and
35 observations with a payment of 31.50 euro for the decision maker (both in the order OTH-
IND-ALL). We find no significant difference comparing the two different payment conditions;
the investment level in OTH and the shift are almost equal in both conditions. Table B.8 shows
and overview of the results.
Table B.8: Fixed Payment Differences
πm = 0 (70) πm = 31.5 (35) Difference (p-value)
XO 3.91 (1.85) 4.03 (2.26) -0.12 (0.701)
SO -0.77∗∗∗ (2.11) -0.63 (2.37) -0.14 (0.769)
Notes. The table reports averages in investments and shifts in the three treatments separated by order. The last
column shows the p-values from a permutation test comparing the two previous columns. The asterisks refer to the
p-value from a permutation test testing the H0 that differences equal zero (* = p <0.1, ** = p <0.05, *** = p <0.01).
B.3 Risk Categorization via IND
In the main text, we consider general risk as out measure for subjects’ risk attitudes. However,
we can also use XI as a measure for risk attitudes (Charness et al., 2013). If we replicate table
1 by using the categories “below median XI ” and “above median XI ” we find similar results
which support observation 2.
32







XI 4.53 (2.42) 2.27 (0.87) 6.67 (1.73)
XA 3.92 (1.91) 2.46 (1.18) 5.24 (1.73)
XO 3.87 (2.21) 2.60 (1.62) 4.92 (2.16)
SA -0.60∗∗∗ (1.57) 0.20 (0.83) -1.43 (1.83)
SO -0.65∗∗∗ (2.39) 0.34 (1.62) -1.75 (2.61)
Notes. The second column contains all observations. The next two columns categorize subjects in two groups according
to XI which can be seen as a measure of risk attitudes. Subjects in the group below median (above median) invested
below (above) median investment levels in IND. Rows report average investments and average shifts together with the
standard deviation in parentheses. The asterisks refer to the p-value from a permutation test testing the Null that S
equals zero (** = p <0.05, *** = p <0.01).
B.4 Instructions
Find below the translated instructions for the order OTH-IND-ALL. They start with general in-
structions, followed by the three separate instructions for each treatment which were distributed
only when the preceding treatment was concluded. The German instructions are available upon
request.
INSTRUCTIONS
Welcome to the experiment. Please do not talk to any other participant from now on. We
kindly ask you to use only those functions of the PC that are necessary for the conduct of
the experiment. The purpose of this experiment is to study decision behavior. You can earn
real money in this experiment. Your payment will be determined solely by your own decisions
according to the rules on the following pages. The data from the experiment will be anonymized
and cannot be related to the identities of the participants. Neither the other participants nor
the experimenter will find out which choices you have made and how much you have earned
during the experiment.
SUB EXPERIMENTS
You will participate in three independent sub experiments followed by a short questionnaire.
For each sub experiment you receive a new set of instructions. Of the three sub experiments
only one will be paid out at the end of the experiment. The payoff relevant experiment will be
randomly determined by the roll of a die.
EXPERIMENT 1 [Treatment OTH ]
Groups - At the begin of the experiments you will be randomly organized in groups of seven
participants. Your group affiliation has no impact on your tasks or our payment.
Role - In this part participants are either active or passive members. In each group there
is only one active member. This member decides for the other six members and, thereby,
determines their payoff. The active group member will randomly be determined at the end of
the experiment. First, all participants decide as the active member for all other group members.
At the end of the experiment the real active member will be determined and his decision will
be implemented.
Task - In the following your decision as an active member will be explained. The passive
members receive 9 euro each. You now decide for each of the other members how much of
their 9 euro to invest in a risky project. The investment is the same for each passive group
member, i.e., when you invest a certain amount then you invest this amount for each passive
group member. The remaining amount (9 euro - Investment) will be paid out to each passive
member independent of the project’s success.
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The project is either a success or a failure. In case of a success each passive member gets her
invested amount back and in addition receives 2.5 times of the investment as a gain:
Payment in case of success = 9 + 2.5×Investment.
In case of a failure the investment is lost:
Payment in case of failure = 9−Investment.
Whether the project is successful will be determined by the throw of a six-sided die at the end
of the experiment. In case of a five or six, the project is a success, in case of a one, two, three
or four the project is a failure. The probability of success is therefore 33.33%.
The active member receives no payoff in this sub experiment.
Procedure - Details on how to enter the investments - calculation of potential payments, fields
of entry, etc - will be displayed on the upper part of your screen once the experiment has started.
EXPERIMENT 2 [Treatment IND ]
In this experiment you decide only for yourself, independent of the other participants. You
receive 9 euro and decide how much of their 9 euro to invest in a risky project. The remaining
amount (9 euro - Investment) will be paid out independent of the project’s success.
The project is either a success or a failure. In case of a success You will get your invested
amount back and in addition receive 2.5 times of the investment as a gain:
Payment in case of success = 9 + 2.5×Investment.
In case of a failure the investment is lost:
Payment in case of failure = 9−Investment.
Whether the project is successful will be determined by the throw of a six-sided die at the end
of the experiment. In case of a five or six, the project is a success, in case of a one, two, three
or four the project is a failure. The probability of success is therefore 33.33%.
Procedure - Details on how to enter the investments - calculation of potential payments, fields
of entry, etc - will be displayed on the upper part of your screen once the experiment has started.
EXPERIMENT 3 [Treatment ALL]
Groups - At the begin of the experiments you will be randomly organized in groups of
seven participants. You will be regrouped, this means that the group members are not the
same as in the first sub experiment. Your group affiliation has no impact on your tasks or your
payment.
Role - In this part participants are either active or passive members. In each group there is
only one active member. This member decides for himself and the other six members and, there
by, determines the payoffs for the whole group. The active group member will randomly be
determined at the end of the experiment.First, all participants decide as the active member for
all group members. At the end of the experiment the real active member will be determined
and his decision will be implemented.
Task - In the following your decision as an active member will be explained. Each group member
(active and passive) members receives 9 euro each. You now decide for each member of the
group, including yourself, how much of the 9 euro to invest in a risky project. The investment
is the same for each passive group member, i.e., when you invest a certain amount then you
invest this amount for yourself and for each passive group member. The remaining amount (9
euro - Investment) will be paid out to each group member independent of the project’s success.
The project is either a success or a failure. In case of a success each group member gets her
invested amount back and in addition receives 2.5 times of the investment as a gain:
Payment in case of success = 9 + 2.5×Investment.
In case of a failure the investment is lost:
Payment in case of failure = 9−Investment.
Whether the project is successful will be determined by the throw of a six-sided die at the end
of the experiment. In case of a five or six, the project is a success, in case of a one, two, three
or four the project is a failure. The probability of success is therefore 33.33%.
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Procedure - Details on how to enter the investments — calculation of potential payments,
fields of entry, etc— will be displayed on the upper part of your screen once the experiment has
started.
END OF EXPERIMENT
At first we will determine, by the roll of a die, which experiment will determine your payoff.
Thereafter, a separate dice roll for each group will determine whether the project was successful
or not. After you answered a short questionnaire your payment will be shown at your screen.
Please enter the amount on your receipt. You will be called individually to the payoff desk.
Please bring the small number plate and the signed receipt with you. The payment will be in
cash, private and anonymous.
B.5 Decision Screens
Figures B.9 to B.9 provide screenshots of the investment decisions in each treatment. Subjects
were able to enter arbitrary investment levels in the field “EINSATZ in euro” (Investment in
euro). A click on the gray button (Generate Payoffs) added a new line to a table. The table
listed the chosen investment and the potential payoffs for the passive and the active members
together depending on the treatments together with the respective probabilities. The ultimate
investment was chosen by marking one line in the list and by clicking the red button (CONFIRM
YOUR DEFINITIVE INVESTMENT). Then a pop-up asked whether the decision is ultimate or
whether the subject wants to revise it. In this example, the subject first entered an investment
amount of 2.86 euro, then 1.75 euro, and then 8.62 euro. The amount 5.67 euro was not
generated yet. However, the investment 1.75 euro was chosen and the red button opened the
dialog for a final confirmation of the choice. The z-Tree code is available upon request.
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Figure B.9: Screenshot of Investment Decision: IND
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Figure B.9: Screenshot of Investment Decision: ALL
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Figure B.9: Screenshot of Investment Decision: OTH
C Sessions with IND, ALL, and LIM
C.1 Order Effects
To test whether an order effect has an impact on investment levels in LIM, we compare 49
observations in which subjects made investment decisions in the order LIM-IND-ALL and 56
observations in the order ALL-IND-LIM.
We make use of a permutation tests to evaluate the Null that investment levels and shifts do
not differ comparing the two different orders. As table B.7 indicates, the order of the treatments
has an effect on the main variables of interest. However, observation 1 also holds for the two
subsets.
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Table C.10: Order Differences
LIM-IND-ALL (49) ALL-IND-LIM (56) Difference (p-value)
XI 4.77 (1.85) 4.34 (2.19) 0.34 (0.284)
XL 6.30 (2.12) 7.33 (2.06) -1.03 (0.013)
SL 1.52∗∗∗ (2.49) 2.98∗∗∗ (2.67) -1.46 (0.005)
Notes. The table reports averages in investments and shifts in LIM separated by order. The last column shows the
p-values from a permutation test comparing the two previous columns. The asterisks refer to the p-value from a
permutation test testing the H0 that differences equal zero (* = p <0.1, ** = p <0.05, *** = p <0.01).
C.2 Instructions
The instructions for LIM simply replace the instructions for OTH (Section B.4). Instructions
for LIM50 just replaced the 5 percent by 50 percent.
EXPERIMENT 1 [Treatment LIM ]
Groups - At the begin of the experiments you will be randomly organized in groups of seven
participants. Your group affiliation has no impact on your tasks or our payment.
Role - In this part participants are either active or passive members. In each group there
is only one active member. This member decides for the other six members and, thereby,
determines their payoff. The active group member will randomly be determined at the end of
the experiment. First, all participants decide as the active member for all other group members.
At the end of the experiment the real active member will be determined and his decision will
be implemented.
Task - In the following your decision as an active member will be explained. The passive
members receive 9 euro each. You now decide for each of the other members how much of
their 9 euro to invest in a risky project. The investment is the same for each passive group
member, i.e., when you invest a certain amount then you invest this amount for each passive
group member. The remaining amount (9 euro - Investment) will be paid out to each passive
member independent of the project’s success.
The project is either a success or a failure. In case of a success each passive member gets her
invested amount back and in addition receives 2.5 times of the investment as a gain. The active
member receives 5 % from the gain of each passive member:
Payment in case of success
Profit = 2.5× Investment
passive member = 9 + 95%× Profit
active member = 6× 5%× Profit
In case of a failure the investment is lost and the active member receives no payment
Payment in case of failure
passive member = 9− Investment
active member = 0
Whether the project is successful will be determined by the throw of a six-sided die at the end
of the experiment. In case of a five or six, the project is a success, in case of a one, two, three
or four the project is a failure. The probability of success is therefore 33.33%.
Procedure - Details on how to enter the investments - calculation of potential payments, fields
of entry, etc - will be displayed on the upper part of your screen once the experiment has started.
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C.3 Decision Screen
Figures C.10 provides a screenshots of the investment decisions for treatment LIM similar to
section B.5.
Figure C.10: Screenshot of Investment Decision: LIM
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D Gender Effects
We added this section for those researchers who are interested in gender effects in risk taking.
Charness and Gneezy (2012) provide evidence for a gender effect in the Gneezy and Potters
(1997) environment with varying payments and probabilities. To test whether a gender effect,
or rather a sex effect, has an impact on investment levels, we compare the observations in
which females made investment decisions to the observations in which males made investment
decisions. As table D.11 indicates, males invest significantly more than females in IND, ALL,
and LIM, i.e. in all treatments in which the money managers faces true outcome consequences.
Investments in OTH, however, are not different. The general patterns from observation 1 and
3 and holds for both sex though.
Table D.11: Gender differences
Males Females Difference (p-value)
XI(162/132) 4.99 (2.41) 3.91 (1.82) 1.08 (<0.001)
XA(162/132) 4.59 (2.21) 3.72 (1.54) 0.87 (<0.001)
XO(75/65) 4.14 (2.37) 3.56 (1.99) 0.58 (0.119)
XL(59/46) 7.20 (2.12) 6.39 (2.11) 0.81 (0.055)
SA(162/132) -0.40∗∗∗ (1.39) -0.19 (1.38) -0.21 (0.193)
SO(59/46) -0.69∗∗ (2.62) -0.61∗∗ (2.13) -0.08 (0.842)
SL(75/65) 1.84∗∗∗ (2.56) 2.89∗∗∗ (2.69) -1.05 (0.45)
Notes. The table reports averages in investments and shifts separated by sex. The numbers in column one report the
number of observations for males and females (males/females). The last column shows the p-values from a permutation
test comparing the two previous columns. The asterisks refer to the p-value from a permutation test testing the H0
that differences equal zero (* = p <0.1, ** = p <0.05, *** = p <0.01).
In a debriefing questionnaire, we ask several questions on risk aversion in line with Dohmen
et al. (2011). Using a Mann-Whitney U test, we find significant gender differences in questions
about risk taking in general (p = 0.004), driving a car (p = 0.019), and making financial
decisions (p = 0.002). We find no effect in questions on risk taking in sports and leisure
(p = 0.074). in career (p = 0.319), health (p = 0.937), trust in strangers (p = 0.567), or in a
hypothetical investment decision (p = 0.132).
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